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SITE DEVELOPMENT IN DEEP KARST TERRAIN
Thomas P. Hart, P.E., R.G.
Black & Veatch Corporation
Overland Park, Kansas

Giuliana Zelada-Tumialan, P.E.
Black & Veatch Corporation
Overland Park, Kansas

ABSTRACT
The development of a site for a power plant was complicated by the presence of pinnacled karst bedrock located beneath more than 24 meters
(80 feet) of intermediate geo-materials (IGM). Shallow mat foundations had been planned in the conceptual design. Detailed subsurface
investigations included an extensive supplemental drilling phase that identified a complex layer of pinnacled karst lying beneath a hard, nearly
inelastic layer of residual IGM. In an effort to keep the site on shallow foundations, the design team attempted a preload approach to pretest the
load-bearing capacity of the potentially karst prone site. Project schedule constraints required the preload be removed and abandoned in lieu of
more positive, fast-track solutions after detection of collapse-like movements. With schedule milestones fast approaching, the project moved to
conventional H-piles to expedite foundation construction. The pile design effort included an indicator pile program with confirmation borings, a
static load test and PDA testing. Pile installations were installed up to a depth of 101 meters (332 feet) and rejections penetrated over 125
meters (410 feet). Predicted averages for the project were met at 30 meters (100 feet). Project evolution included settlement plots for 28 shallow
settlement plates and three deep anchors reflecting not consolidation, but small shear movements as the overburden crushed the underlying
pinnacles.

BACKGROUND
New power demands worldwide often require development of new
generating stations. Site selection for new generating stations is
dictated by numerous factors and considerations, not the least of
which may, perhaps be geology and topography. Power producers
often look for unpopulated or industrial areas, near intersections of
existing transmission and fuel supplies (gas, oil or rail/coal), and
near a generous, available water supply. Site issues such as
floodplains, seismicity, expansive soils, topography, and karst
conditions are often economically balanced against transmission,
fuel and water issues within the larger scheme of developing a new
generating station.

SITE
Atlanta
Birmingham

In late 2001, Black & Veatch was selected to provide engineering,
procurement and construction for a new power plant in northeast
Alabama. The new generating station would provide northeast
Alabama and many new developments, such as the new Honda
Plant in nearby Lincoln, a dependable supply of electricity. The
subject site is located in southwest Calhoun County, Alabama,
between Birmingham and Atlanta.
The southern end of the Appalachian Mountains around
Birmingham is well known for karst activity. The problems with
karst development in the Birmingham area are well documented by
George Sowers. Most notably and invaluable to our work was the
publication “Building on Sinkholes,” by George Sowers, published
by ASCE (1996). What is not well referenced is the areal extent of
the karst prone area. The unfortunate reality in underdeveloped,
rural areas is that construction encounters with karst are rarely if at
all documented, and can only be discovered through conversation
with local residents and contractors. A local Birmingham area
engineer who was interviewed during the investigation had no
knowledge of the karst terrain extending this far east of
Birmingham. As the project moved forward, more information
about encounters with karst in the area began to surface, including
the nearby Honda Plant, Telledega Superspeedway, and an
Anniston shopping mall parking structure.

Figure 1
Site Location
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INVESTIGATION
The preliminary investigation was planned to provide information
to support foundation choices and support the development of the
cost of foundations and grading. There was no prior knowledge of
soil or bedrock conditions other than the County Soil Survey and
the State Geologic Map. Preliminary review of existing literature
showed the site was located within the Valley and Ridge
physiographic provence of the Appalachian Highlands. Local
bedrock was identified as Ordovician and Cambrian aged dolomite
and limestone.
The field investigation included 10 conventional SPT borings
planned to depths of 21.3 meters (70 feet). Preliminary
investigations typically estimate boring depths by the 2B rule of
thumb, plus some additional length for good measure. Given the
upland topography, we anticipated encountering bedrock at some
point prior to the planned depth. The largest foundation for this
type of plant is the combustion turbine (CT) foundation, typically
about 7.6 meters (25 feet) wide. The field investigation also
included piezometers, soil resistivity tests and test pits.
There were a few surprises coming out of the investigation. First,
the depth to bedrock was greater than anticipated and second, the
overburden soil was stiff to hard residual intermediate geo-material
(IGM) throughout the borings. The biggest surprise was finding a
soft pocket of soil, just above bedrock in two of the ten borings,
outside of the power block where the major foundations are
located. The soft zone was at a depth of over 25 meters (85 feet)!
Here lies the great chasm between theory and practice. Will a soft
zone beneath 25 meters of IGM effect shallow foundation design?
Our conclusion was

that our 7.6 meter wide foundations would not be affected when
following conventional consolidation theory. But what about karst
terrain and future sinkhole development or collapse?
The final field investigation attempted to comprehensively probe
the limits and extent of karst at the site. Thirty-three additional
borings were advanced to refusal at the site with bedrock cores
collected in eight of the borings. What was found completely
changed our opinion about the suitability of shallow foundations at
the site. The site was underlain by severely pinnacled limestone.
The investigation started off in dramatic fashion with the first
boring encountering much softer clay from the ground surface
through the entire IGM zone, beneath one of the heaviest, most
critical pieces of equipment. The rest of the borings were a mixed
bag of strong IGM overlying either bedrock or soft clay. The top of
bedrock was defined at depths ranging from 10 meters (33 feet) to
40 meters (132 feet). Borings extending beyond 21 meters found
the signature soft, normally consolidated clay typically found in
slots between pinnacles of limestone. The thickness of the slot
material varied from very thin to thicknesses of 15 meters (50 feet)
or more.

RISK-BASED SOLUTIONS
We now had to address the uncertainty of the karst behavior over
the life of the power plant. We could not find a reference of a deep
karst site in residual upland environments that had seen ravelling or
collapse. Sites with pinnacle or karst development at this depth are
rare in the Appalachians.

Figure 2 East-West Cross Section
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Sowers suggests using pre-loads to simulate the weight of the
foundations. If the pre-load was too heavy for the pinnacled karst
system to support, the overburden would crush the pinnacles or
settle over the pinnacles until stable. The entire process would
occur faster and more immediately than typical consolidation
theory would suggest, but just how fast was unknown. The project
went ahead with plans to preload the site with 4.6 meters (15 feet)
of pre-load, on top of an already cut and filled plant site. Maximum
thickness of fill, including the preload, would reach nearly eight
meters toward the east end of the site. If the pre-load triggered
sinkholes or caused significant settlements, the project would
review other options, including cap grouting or deep foundations.
Local wisdom shared by engineers in the Birmingham area warned
that both grouting and deep foundations were fraught with risk.
Grouting could interrupt drainage, triggering collapse. Deep
foundations costs could be difficult to control with uncertain and
extremely variable depths to bedrock.

CONSTRUCTION
Pre-Load
The pre-load was scheduled for three months. The monitoring plan
incorporated both conventional settlement plates installed
immediately beneath the preload, and borros anchors, drilled in and
installed 25 meters below the plant grade. The shallow plates
would reflect an overall picture of settlements across the site. The
deep plates would identify how much settlement was occurring in
soft clay between the limestone pinnacles.
Predicting the amount of settlement from consolidation tests was
determined by what was thought to be fairly conservative
measures. Residual clays in the upper 20 to 25 meters crushed
Shelby tubes, and the gravel content of the clay made quality
sample selections very difficult. As a result, only the softest soils at
depth were characterized for consolidation characteristics. The
consolidation parameters from deeper soil were used to
characterize the entire overburden thickness, resulting in a worstcase consolidation settlement prediction.
The early settlement readings were variable. Some areas showed
no movement for weeks. Others would settle one week, stop
moving for several more weeks, only to resume movement later on.

Settlement Plate (Typ)

Borros Anchor (Typ)

7

14

21

Figure 3: Settlement Plate Plan
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Figure 4. Illustrates data from 8 settlement plates beneath a CT/transformer foundation. Settlement data reflects characteristic recurring
movement and stabilization reflecting the crushing behavior of the overburden. The dashed deep plate, anchored just above bedrock
reflected compression of the soft soil between pinnacles. Stability was reflected in 23 of 28 plates at 70 days. At 75 days, 3 of the 7 plates at
Unit 2 (Not shown, westernmost foundation on fill) resumed movement, as well as plate 11 seen here.

The settlement data (Figure 4) for the foundation near the center of
the pre-load illustrates the chaotic behavior of the karst regime.
The predicted consolidation is shown as the smooth, hyperbolic
solid line. The deep borros anchor is the dashed line. Both
shallow plate and deep anchor data illustrates the stop-start
settlement behavior.
At 75 days, the data appeared to be stabilizing. Plans were
underway to begin stripping preload at the west end of the preload. At 80 days, preload removal had begun when the final set of
readings were collected. However, unexpected news soon

Paper No. 6.10

followed: several plates beneath the west and center foundations
had begun moving again. The stripping of pre-load was stopped.
Predicting the remaining duration of the settlement and
stabilization proved impossible. Difficult decisions had to be made
quickly to maintain the construction schedule.
Early discussions with compaction grouting contractors turned up
no guarantees. Grouting contractors were expensive and unwilling
to warranty the results. The project turned to steel H-piles to
reduce risk to the major foundations and to maintain schedule. The
uncertainty of quantities were managed during construction.

4

26

5000.00

4900.00

1

2

8

9

15

16

3

4

10

11

17

18

22

5

6

12

13

19

20

23

24
27

25
28

7

14

2100.00

2200.00

21
2300.00

2400.00

2500.00

2600.00

2700.00

26
1

2

8

9

15

16

5000.0
3
0

4

10

11

17

18

22

5

6

12

13

19

20

23

4900.0
0

24
27

25
28

7
2100.0
0

14
2200.0
0

21
2300.0
0

2400.0
0

2500.0
0

2600.0
0

2700.0
0

1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
-0.20
-0.40
-0.60
-0.80
-1.00
-1.20
-1.40
-1.60
-1.80
-2.00
-2.20
-2.40
-2.60

Figure 5. Final (total) settlement contours (distance in feet, settlement in inches). Areas of the greatest settlement magnitude at the surface
grade are shaded dark (bottom). The circular nature of the concentrated settlement may reflect karst movement with maximum settlements
over six cm. Pile driving records reflect very deep cavities in the bedrock near settlement point 18 with piles reaching depths of over 60 to 90
meters (200 to 300 feet). Conversely, the relatively stable area near settlement 21 reflected very little movement, but piles reached the
greatest depths on the project, with one rejected at a length of 124 meters (407 feet) and some meeting solid refusal at 93 to 101 meters (305
to 332 feet).

RAPID DESIGN

dynamic load tests during an indicator pile program.

The construction schedule drove the foundation design process.
With major foundation construction scheduled to begin in a few
weeks, Black & Veatch engineers set out to interview and hire a
pile driving contractor, the Morris Group of Birmingham. Pile
selection was determined by the availability of materials. A large
quantity of HP 12X63 pile happened to be available. Pile tips
would be protected using APF Hard-Bite pile points. Pile design
capacity would be determined by results of a static load test and

Indicator Piles
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The design objective was to achieve a 534 KN (60-ton) pile with
capacity developed through end bearing on sound limestone,
located at an anticipated average of 100 to 110 feet beneath the
site. The capacity would also have to account for downdrag.
Within two weeks of the decision to use piles, a four-pile

5

Test Pile (TYP)

Confirmatory Boring (TYP)

Figure 6. Indicator piles shown as solid black lines in elevation, over confirmatory offset boring, represening the variability in the top of
rock over very short horizontal distances. HP 12X63 piles refused both above and below where confirmatory borings would indicate.
indicator test program was underway. The indicator piles were
driven under each of the four major foundations. First, four more
borings were drilled at the indicator piles locations to determine the
depth to competent rock. Refusal criteria and ultimate capacity
were developed while driving the piles using a pile driving
analyzer (PDA). A full-scale static load test confirmed the results.
A refusal at five blows per 1.25 cm (five blows per ½ inch)
resulted in the desired allowable capacity of 534 KN (60 tons).
Pile driving hammers selection also proved difficult. The most
widely used hammer in the Birmingham area, the Delmag D19-42,
was mobilized to the site for the indicator program. It was quickly
apparent the 54 KN-m (48,000 ft-lb) hammer could hardly
penetrate the dense IGM overburden requiring between 50 and 100
blows per 30 cm (50 to 100 bpf) from the ground surface to
refusal. The Morris Group switched to a Delmag D30-32 (102
KN-m/75,000 ft-lb), significantly increasing the rate of penetration
to rough average of 15 to 30 blows per 30 cm.
The results of confirmatory drilling were mixed. Piles were driven
to refusal far deeper and shallower than borings offset only a few
feet, confirming the extremely jagged nature of the pinnacled
limestone surface (Figure 5). Using the average lengths of the
indicator pile, Black & Veatch estimated the quantity of pile for the
project at nearly 12,200 lineal meters (40,000 linear feet) with an
average length of 100 feet.
The overall duration between the decision to switch the design to
deep foundations and the completion of the test program was two
weeks, with full scale production beginning in just three weeks.
The demands of the construction schedule were met.
Production Piling
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Pile behavior was typified by hard driving followed by abrupt
refusal. A smaller portion of piles exhibited a decreasing
resistance for some distance above refusal.
Definition and determination of rejected piles remained a work- inprogress throughout the pile driving program. The behavior of the
piles while driving remained relatively consistent through the upper
20 to 25 meter (70 to 80 foot) crust. The upper crust did not
reflect the typical erratic behavior exhibited by suspect piles below
20 to 25 meters. Piles that were advanced significantly beyond
adjacent pile completions were flagged as suspect. Re-evaluation
of each suspect pile was repeated upon subsequent splices. All of
the rejections were based on length or excessive lean (batter).
Consideration was given for these long piles and their location in
the mat, as well as the type of foundation. Piles in the CT mat were
required to take dynamic machine loads, and were held to a tighter
rejection length than those in static foundations (exhaust stacks,
transformers and fuel tank). Piles were also evaluated based on
their adjusted spring constant and whether the mat could handle the
spring constant variability.
When the major foundations were completed, the estimated
average length of pile from the indicator program proved accurate.
The completed average pile length for the 357 production piles
was only 2 inches longer than predicted. The final rejection rate
was just over 8%, far less than the predicted 15%. Piling
predictions and quantities for the fuel tank (located at the far east
end of the site, where the worst predicted conditions were
assumed) were far less favorable. The completed average pile
length for the fuel tank jumped up to 109 feet. The rejection rate
increased to 11%, still significantly less than the 15% prediction.
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Figure 7. Pile tip refusals for three rows of piles. Each row is two to three meters apart. Illustrates the large settlement feature reflected in
Figure 5. The deepest two piles were abandoned for excessive length.

Figure 8. Surface of limestone bedrock, generated from fuel
tan area at the east end of the site.
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Discoveries and Conversation
Tools, such as conversation with property neighbors, would be
very useful to the design process, but is largely impractical since
design investigations are often pre-land-purchase and information
regarding developments is usually confidential.
During the pre-load period, the owner’s project manager walked
along a potential fuel pipeline corridor, north of the site with the
adjacent property owner. When coming across dry pond, the
property owner expounded on how he could not seem to plug the
large holes in the bottom of his “pond.” Upon further
reconnaissance and inspection, we discovered no tell-tail signs of
an excavation. No dam or spoils pile were evident, very unusual
characteristics for an old pond. The dry pond appears to be a very
large, 30 meter by 60 meter sinkhole, three to five meters deep,
with several one half meter to three meter diameter throats
daylighting along the base. The probable sinkhole is more than
double the size of the largest foundation planned on site, and was
located in dense woods, approximately 30 meters north of the
property line.
The neighbor bordering the south side of the site reported his
ponds “flushing” right before his eyes some years prior to this
project. The neighbor clearly recalled watching his prized fish
disappearing into the cavern. The resourceful man borrowed a
sheeps-foot roller and proceeded to plug the hole with compacted
clay, thereby successfully rehabilitating his pond.

Figure 9. Karst throat inside the dry pond.
CONCLUSIONS
Great caution should be exercised when investigating sites with
underlying carbonate bedrock. If preliminary borings had stopped
in the hard overburden crust at a depth equal to two times the
foundation width, the karst conditions would have gone undetected.
Some portion of any karst site investigation must examine the
depth and condition of the bedrock. Great care should be exercised
when proceeding with foundation design.
Driven pile foundations would not be the first choice given such
deep karst conditions. However, pile foundations can be
successfully driven in Deep Karst Terrain through hard IGM soils.
Quantities can be reasonably predicted and controlled using tried
and true indicator pile test programs coupled with static and
dynamic load testing and a well defined refusal and rejection
criteria.

Figure 8. “Dry Pond” located on adjacent property, about 30
meters north of the site.

As time went on, more shallow depressions became apparent in the
surrounding countryside, visible only as temporary ponds, which
would appear in fields after large rainfall events and quickly
disappear over the next few days. These shallow depressions do
not have enough relief to appear on typical U.S.G.S topographic
maps.
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